Category

Constitution

The Expulsion Law

By | Constitution, In the News, nation state, Recent, Uncategorized | No Comments

On July 20 2016, the Knesset passed the final approval of “The Expulsion Law” according to which, a serving Member of the Knesset may be removed from his position if three quarters of the Knesset Committee members determine that he has incited to racism or expressed support for an armed struggle against the State of Israel.[1] This law has aroused protests among many members of the Opposition and certain organizations such as Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) that present themselves as being concerned for the rights of Israel’s minorities. According to them, the law constitutes a mortal blow to the values of democracy. They further claim that its sole purpose is to expel Arab Knesset members.
In order to attempt and resolve the issue, we have chosen to study the state of affairs in countries possessing characteristics and regimes similar to those of Israel i.e., democratic nation states. Accordingly, the study presented below examined limitations imposed on political parties and on members of parliament in twelve democratic states, members of the OECD. The study surveyed the existence and actual implementation of legal preventative measures that restrict the foundation or registration of political parties seeking to participate in elections, and also retroactive steps including disassembly or disqualification of a party after its foundation, and suspension or expulsion of a serving member of parliament.

This publication constitutes a complementary study to two relevant studies on the subject published by the Knesset Research and Information Center (hereinafter: RIC) that were conducted in 2006 and 2016 and that, among others, is based on their findings.
This study reveals a clear picture:

Not a single country granted its citizens the full and unrestricted right to vote and be elected.

  • Six of the twelve countries surveyed impose limitations on the registration of political parties.
  • Nine of the twelve countries surveyed enable the suspension or legal disqualification of a political party.

A combination of the findings of our study with those of the RIC from 2006 and 2016 reveals that:

  • Fifteen of the twenty-eight countries surveyed impose limitations on the activity of political parties.
  • Fifteen of the twenty-eight countries surveyed enable the suspension or legal disqualification of a political party.
  • Eight of the twenty-four countries surveyed implement expulsion or suspension of a member of parliament for different behavioral offences, aside from any legal proceedings that may be initiated.

A summary conclusion of the three studies reveals the existence of substantial limitations on political activity (mainly of political parties), of differing levels of severity, while making use of a range of legal and constitutional procedures. A comparative view of the existing arrangements in the different countries suggests that the “Expulsion Law” represents a unique version in relation to parallel laws around the world. Nevertheless, when considering the Supreme Court’s practical disregard for the existing legislation, and given the restrictive and stringent circumstances regarding its activation, it serves as a legitimate (and some would say, even necessary) defense mechanism for creating a fitting balance between freedom of expression and stability of the democratic regime.

[1] Jonathan Lis, After Stormy Debate Knesset Approves Law Allowing Ouster of Lawmakers, Ha’aretz, July 20, 2016. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.731962

to the full research…

17th Knesset Zionist Legislasion Scale

By | Constitution, nation state | No Comments

Zionist Legislation

 

As the 17th Knesset draws to an end, the Institute of Zionist Strategies is proud to publish the Zionist Legislation Scale, in which gold, silver and bronze medals were awarded to Members of Knesset who excelled in Zionist legislation activism.

 

What is the Zionist Legislation Scale?

 

The Zionist Legislation Scale Report is being published for the first time by the Institute of Zionist Strategies in preparation for the upcoming elections. The report summarizes the Zionist legislation passed during the term of the 17th Knesset, from Nissan 5766 (March 2006) to Shvat 5769 (February 2009).  The report only contains laws and amendments that passed the entire legislation process.  This report praises the Zionist activism of MKs who excelled in passing these laws.

 

What is Zionist Legislation?

 

Zionism, in this day in age, is a concept that is open to broad interpretation.  The definition of Zionism can be quite vague and minimalist (for example, establishing a State for the Jewish nation), or alternatively, very comprehensive (for instance, creating a perfect society that will set an example for the world).

 

We, at the Institute for Zionist Strategies, believe that Zionist activity should be understood as the strengthening the State of Israel as a National Home for the Jewish Nation, by means of intensifying its Jewish identity.

 

According to this definition, Zionist legislature can be realized both on a classical practical level, by supporting settlement, security, or Aliya absorption, for instance, and similarly by means of actualizing the principles and values that the State of Israel was built upon and were stated in the Declaration of Independence.

 

Results

 

Ten leading MKs comprise the head of the Zionist pyramid of the exiting Knesset.  MK Ya’akov Margi (Shas) ranked first place and won the gold medal.  The silver medal was received by MKs Otniel Shneller, Rabbi Michael Malkior and Moshe Kahlon, in that order.  The bronze medal went to MKs Amnon Cohen, Gilad Erdan, Aryeh Eldad, Uri Ariel, Yitzhak Levi and Avshalom Vilan.

 

 

For the full report click here.

National Preference Areas

By | Constitution, nation state, National Public Lands | No Comments

A Proposal for Government Policymaking

As prepared for a meeting with the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office (2.09.09)

 

Read first the historical brief (Hebrew)

 

Following is an opinion piece by the Institute for Zionist Strategies concerning principles central to the implementation of policy in accordance with the National Preference Areas Law:

  • The National Preference Areas Law is a good law that provides a suitable framework for the government to achieve the goal of the law: promoting the development of areas or towns defined as having national preference.
  • Clear standards are necessary as they facilitate transparency and prevent political decision making due to political pressure (mayors, party activists, etc.).
  • Therefore, the considerations presented in this law must be transformed into clear standards.  Our proposal is to accept the considerations as a whole as a conditional system as proposed below:
    • Sufficient condition (If A exists, then B exists.  Therefore, it is sufficient for one condition to exist in order to include a particular settlement in a national preference area)
      • Population distribution planning (Subclause 3 as appears in Chapter 26: National Preference Areas, Clause 151-B).
      • The burden of absorbing aliya (6).
    • Necessary Conditions (If A does not exist, then B does not exist, therefore, if the condition does not exist, a settlement may not be included in a National Preference Area – aside from if it fulfills one of the sufficient conditions):
      • The economic and social strength of the area (2).
      • The necessity to bridge gaps (5).
      • Tax collection rates (appears as a condition in Clause 152-A).
      • National, civil and military service enlistment rates (does not appear as a consideration in the current law, thought it should serve as a condition as will be explained later in this document).
    • Other conditions
      • The security situation (1).
      • Geographic location in relation to the central region of the State or the distance to a population center (4).
      • Additional considerations with the approval of the Financial Committee (7).
  • A large portion of the debate concerning National Preference Areas in the Knesset Financial Committee revolves around considerations, concerning which the government is supposed to make decisions.  It is advisable to notice that despite the order of the considerations having no formal legal significance, members of Knesset requested that the security situation in the region or a particular settlement be placed first in order to highlight its importance.
  • In the event that the issue is presented to the Supreme Court again, a legal opinion piece should be prepared which is to clarify the difference between basic rights and privileges, and by means of such to explain why defining certain areas as national preference areas does not upset the equality principle.  Moreover, because the security consideration is a central consideration, it is reasonable to assume that most towns that do not suffer from security issues will not be entitled to such privileges.
  • It is advantageous to include military (or national/civil) service as a necessary condition for several reasons:
    • Because the number of beneficiaries of the law is limited, it fitting to give preference to those who partake in the burden.
    • Military service is a main cause of mobility within Israeli society and serves as an effective tool in bridging gaps in Israeli society.
    • It is possible to see encouragement of service for the State as a legitimate national consideration.
  • In addition, it is proposed to investigate the situation and consider the possibility that the substandard conditions of Arab towns are not a result of a lack of government support.  It may in fact be true that Israeli Arabs receive more government support than do Jewish citizens of Israel.
  • An additional proposal that is not directly related to the law: In 1949, the first transit camps were established, which in time turned into development towns.  Despite 2009 being the sixtieth year of development towns, it is proposed to designate Israel’s 62nd anniversary as a commemoration of sixty years of development towns.

“A Constitution for Israel” The Institute for Zionist Strategies’ Constitution Proposal

By | Constitution | No Comments

The IZS Constitution Proposal contains one hundred clauses.  The Declaration of Independence serves as the Preamble of the Constitution.  The Declaration of Independence’s role as the Preamble stems from its function as a founding document of the Jewish Nation as it returned its land and because its acceptance by a majority of the Jewish population of the State of Israel.  As proof, in honor of the State of Israel’s 60th Independence Day, no fewer than ninety Members of Knesset signed a renewed version of the Declaration of Independence, in an initiative of the Institute for Zionist Strategies.  Additionally, in Clause 4 of the Constitution, it is stated that the Preamble (that is to say the Declaration of Independence) is an inseparable part of the Constitution.  It also states, as a formal safeguarding measure, that a two-thirds majority of Knesset Members is required to change the Preamble of the Constitution.

Our Constitution Proposal is complete and coherent, and proposes clauses connected to the identity components of the State and governmental arrangements.  The Constitution Proposal is divided into ten chapters:

  1. A) Basic Principles of the State (Clauses 1-4).
  2. B) Civil and Human Liberties (Clauses 5-20).
  3. C) The National Home for the Jewish People (Clauses 21-31).
  4. D) The President of the State (Clauses 32-36).
  5. E) The Legislative Authority (Clauses 37-48).
  6. F) The Executive Authority (Clauses 49-64).
  7. G) The Judiciary (Clauses 65-80).
  8. H) The State Comptroller (Clauses 81-88).
  9. I) The Status of the Constitution and other Legislation (Clauses 89-98).
  10. J) Ratification and Amendment of the Constitution (Clauses 99-100).

Following is a short description of each of the primary arrangements presented in each chapter and the rationale behind each one.  The summary was not intended to individually represent each clause of the proposal (for more aspects of the Constitution Proposal, you can read the summary written by Prof. Avraham Diskin in the preface to the IZS’s Constitution Proposal or the comparison between the IZS proposal and that of the Israel Democracy Institute).

 

A. Basic Principles of the State

This chapter emphasizes the characteristics and principles of the State of Israel.  The first clause in the Constitution states “The State of Israel is a Jewish State and the National Home of the Jewish People”. Additionally it states that “the Jewish People fulfills its yearning for self-determination in accordance with its historical and cultural heritage”.  This serves as the identity clause that secures the Jewish-Zionist nature of the State.

Clause 2 states that “The State of Israel is a democratic state, which respects human rights in the spirit of the Jewish heritage’s principles of freedom, justice, integrity and peace”.  Clause 3 states that “the State’s sovereignty inheres in its citizens”.

These clauses, and the Preamble to the Constitution (The Declaration of Independence) are unchangeable, except for a two-thirds majority of the Members of Knesset.

B. Civil and Human Liberties

This chapter contains the arrangements regarding the Human Liberties Document, by means of recognizing each person as being created in the divine image and endowed with freedom and dignity.  The rights listed are the rights to life, limb, and safety, the right to preservation of privacy, the right to property, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of culture and of opinion, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and of association, the right to have a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

It is also determined in this chapter that Israeli citizenship is to be granted and nullified according to statute.  In this manner, the Constitution remains flexible in its allowing the legislature to determine the citizenship arrangements required for the State of Israel. Over the course of the meetings of the Constitution Committee of the 17th Knesset, the IZS proposed an additional version of citizenship (A description can be found in the Activities chapter).

With regard to the right to equality, the Constitution Proposal states that “All are equal before the law; rights and obligations apply equally to all citizens of the State; the failure to fulfill obligations may entail the loss of rights and eligibilities, as shall be determined by statute. In areas relating to the security of the State, the State my restrict rights, obligations, and eligibility for public office to those with appropriate security clearance”.

This chapter also deals with the relationship between the various rights, the balance between them, the restriction clause, and more.

 

C. The National Home of the Jewish People

This chapter deals with the resolution of the Jewish character of the State.  A portion of the arrangements can already be found in the Basic Laws, for example the establishment of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, some are expressed in regular laws, and some are not mentioned in any statute.

This chapter includes many arrangements relating to the Jewish identity of the State, for example – Hebrew as the official language, the Jewish calendar as the official calendar, Independence Day as a national holiday, etc.

Similarly, the minorities’ rights are protected in terms of their days of rest, culture, language, settlement and education.

 

Clause 27 secures the State of Israel’s obligation to “ingather the Diaspora of Israel and to establish Jewish settlement in Israel, and [it will] allocate lands and resources for these purposes”.

 

D. The President of the State

This paragraph outlines the authorities and activities of the President of the State.  This chapter secures the regulations that appear in the Basic Law: The President of the State.

 

E. The Legislative Authority

This chapter regulates the instructions relating to the activities of the Knesset, elections, etc.

Clause 40 states that the Knesset will be elected by means of a general election, that is direct, equal and done by secret ballot.  This differs from the Basic Law of the Knesset, in that it does not specifically state that the elections will be state elections (as opposed to representation by region, for example), thus allowing for change in the governmental system.

 

This chapter states that candidates or parties will not be permitted to run for Knesset if their goals or actions promote the invalidation of the State of Israel as the National Home for the Jewish People, the invalidation of Israel’s democratic government, or support of a hostile state’s armed struggle or any other organization that opposes the State.

 

An interesting innovation of the Constitution is that most MKs would be permitted to initiate referendums regarding matters of sovereignty and constitutional questions.  It also states that a referendum is advisory only and that its results are not binding for the Knesset or for any other authority.

Most of the powers of the Knesset and its members will be dealt with in the statutes in order to allow flexibility for the legislature.

 

F. The Executive Authority

This chapter delineates the activities and powers of the government. Alongside the arrangements currently in place in the Basic Law: The Government, a number of additional arrangements have been put in place.  For example, Clause 53 states that a Member of Knesset who is appointed to serve as a minister in the government must terminate his Knesset Membership as would be stated by law (similar to Norwegian Law).

In addition, as can clearly be seen following the elections for the 18thKnesset, is the ruling that each political party must reach a decision, prior to the elections, as to which prime ministerial candidate it is in support of.  Following the elections, the nominee for Prime Minister receiving the greater number of votes earns the right to assemble the government.  Regarding the Budget Law, it was decided that if the Budget Statute is not accepted by the beginning of the fiscal year, the government is permitted to withdraw the equivalent of the twelfth portion of the previous year’s budget each month.  The novelty in this change is that if the Budget Statute is not passed it is not seen as a lack of confidence in the government.

Another interesting and innovative clause is Clause 63, which resolves the relationship between the political and military echelons.  The arrangements in this clause solidify some of the arrangements currently in effect in Basic Law: The Military.  This clause lists the goals of the military (currently unlisted in Basic Law: The Military), and states that the IDF is responsible for the security of the State, its citizens and residents, and members of the Jewish Nation in distress.

 

G. The Judiciary

This chapter deals with issues concerning the activity of the Judiciary.  This chapter contains new ideas regarding the appointing of judges, the appointing of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the duration of his service, the status of the religious courts and alternative arrangements for marriage and divorce.

This chapter additionally secures the right to be tried according to administrative law by means of restricting the right to petition to those petitioners who are directly affected by the results.  The judicial boundaries are also dealt with here: The court may only become involved in administrative authority if it is clear that the purpose of the action is blatantly improper.  It similarly states that the court will not deal with matters regarding foreign policy, security policy or fundamentals of the budget.

The clauses in this chapter emphasize the independence of Israeli Law by means of giving preference to the principles of freedom, justice, integrity and peace as enunciated in the Jewish heritage.

It should be mentioned that Clause 79 deals with the length of the Chief Justice’s term and limits it to seven years.  Fortunately the 17th Knesset passed a law that dealt with this very issue.

 

H. State Comptroller

There are no significant changes from Basic Law: The State Comptroller.

 

I. The Status of the Constitution and other Legislation

This chapter discusses various issues regarding the normative status of the Constitution.  For example, it has been stated that no statute shall be held to contravene the Constitution, unless a panel of nine or more Supreme Court judges determines that its purpose is blatantly inappropriate.  Nonetheless, the Knesset is permitted to nullify the invalidation of the law, even after the Supreme Court decision.  The Knesset must act within one hundred twenty days of the decision of the Court and the decision must be affirmed by a majority of the Members of Knesset.  It is also stated that no rights or authorities exist aside from what is stated in the Constitution.

Additional regulations: In order to establish a safeguarding provision (sixty-one Members of Knesset, for example), it is required that the law be passed in the second and third readings with the determined majority.  It also states that Emergency Regulations cannot amend or temporarily suspend the authority of the Constitution.  The Knesset may amend this clause with a two-thirds majority.

 

J. Ratification and Amendment of the Constitution

This chapter regulates the way in which the Constitution will be put into effect and dictates the procedure that must be followed in order to make amendments.  The Constitution shall take effect upon its acceptance by a majority of the Members of the Knesset, in a roll-call vote.  Likewise, the wording of the Constitution must pass a public referendum before the second and third readings.  No change may be made to the Constitution except by a majority of the Members of Knesset in a role-call vote. A public referendum must also be held in the event of a change to the Constitution.

In addition, all Basic Laws will be nullified.  The remaining laws that are not included in the Constitution will be covered by new statutes.

 

Downloadable Documents :

IZS Constitution Draft Presentation(PPT Format)

IZS Constitution Draft Full Text

Introduction / Prof. Avraham Diskin

By | Constitution | No Comments

This year’s festive Tu Bi’Shvat session of the Knesset, held on February 13, 2006 by Israel s sixteenth Knesset, focused on the subject of an Israeli constitution. The results of two years of work by the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, headed by Knesset Member Michael Eitan, in preparation for the passage of aconstitution in Israel, were presented to the Knesset. Both the festive Knesset session and the Knesset committee appear to have been working from the assumption that the seventeenth Knesset, elected on March 28, 2006, would complete the passage of the Israeli constitution, an endeavor embarked upon even before theestablishment of the state.

Israel has a fairly well developed system of constitutional arrangements which are, however, incomplete and uneven in nature. Paradoxically, it has been the legislative developments and rulings on constitutional issues of recent years thathave increased the ambiguity and heightened disagreement regarding basicconstitutional issues. This situation underscores the need to pass a constitution as soon as possible.

 

Checks and Balances

Some emphasize the importance of passing a constitution that will be acceptable to all parts of the Israeli public. Unfortunately, there is considerable doubt as to whether it is at all possible to formulate a constitution that everyone can agree upon. Israeli society is divided in many respects and the State of Israel is a state whose very right to exist is even today still called into question by many, from both within and without. Under such circumstances, along with the desire to attaina broad consensus, there is a need to make unequivocal decisions regarding the basic principles upon which the state and its government are founded. The tension between the need to attain a broad consensus, on the one hand, and to make clearcut decisions on the other, is characteristic of the process that every country involvedin determining constitutional frameworks undergoes. In Israel, however, this tension – between the need to find a fine balance between conflicting demands and the need to make clear-cut decisions – appears to be one of the main factors contributing to the delay in the constitutional process.

Among the subjects that formal constitutions deal with, four central issues need to be clearly decided upon:

  1. The basic characteristics and principles of the state;
  1. The status of the individual and the citizen, and the setting of clear guidelines to determine the relations between the individual and the state’s officialinstitutions;
  1. The nature of the government and of the governmental authorities acting on behalf of the state – including the setting of clear guidelines to determine the nature of the relationship among the official authorities themselves and that which exists between them and the citizens of the state;
  1. The setting of guidelines for the pyramid of norms that are binding on the state and, in particular, determining the status of the constitution, as compared to primary legislation, and the effect of the system of norms when the actions and decisions of the legislature and executive are reviewed by the judiciary.

Making decisions on these subjects is not easy and each requires either a fine alance or a clear-cut decision – which are often mutually exclusive.

 

Nationstate and Democracy

Constitutions in enlightened countries aspire by nature to be democratic. But the question of the procedural and practical definition of democracy is no simple matter. History has shown us all too often that democracy must frequently contend with irreconcilable contradictions between its various demands. Moreover, most enlightened countries developed as nation-states. Some might claim that there is an inherent contradiction between the character of a state as a nation-state and its character as a democratic one. Nevertheless, in practical terms, it would appear that most countries have managed to attain a balance whose results are fairly dichotomous, making it reasonably easy to determine if a given regime is democratic, practically speaking, or not. In the Israeli context, decisions have to be made regarding the essence of the state as the national home of the Jewish people, the rights of its minorities and questions of religion and state, which some maintain have been the principal factors responsible for the delay in passing the constitution.

No basic human or civil right is absolute. From this it follows that there exists no absolute freedom or equality. This is all the more so where the contradiction between freedom and equality is concerned, to say nothing of the additional contradictions between other freedoms and rights. A democratic constitution seeks to present not only a “complete” list of rights, but also keys to understanding the contexts inwhich freedoms may be limited and the nature of the decision that must be made when it becomes evident that there is a contradiction between conflicting basic rights.

In view of the collapse of advanced democratic regimes in the twentieth century, we must not forget that every democracy has the right and obligation to defend itself. It must defend itself not only against those who would use violent means to fight it, but also against those who seek to exploit the rules of democracy itself in order to undermine it. This is all the more so in the case of Israel, which findsitself having to combat consistent attempts to oppose its very essence as a Jewish state and even its very existence. A sizeable minority of Israel’s citizens belong to a people a large part of which, regrettably, views itself as Israel’s sworn enemy.

That democracies need to defend themselves against those who would destroy them has been underscored in a number of laws in democratic states and is recognized as a prominent principle of natural law. In the words of Chief Justice Barak, “A constitution is not a recipe for suicide and civil rights are not a vehicle for national destruction.” It is incumbent, therefore, upon the constitution to give expression to the requirement of a democracy to defend itself.

 

Constitution, Law and the Judiciary

The decision regarding the basic characteristics of the form of government is far from philosophical. There is no dearth of examples showing how constitutional arrangements on the questions under discussion can produce the seeds of rifts and division to the point of causing the democratic entity to collapse. In the Israeli context, it would be wise to draw conclusions from changes that have been madein various directions in recent years. In addition, especially salient in the Israeli case is the importance of maintaining the stability of the government and its ability to govern, on the one hand, and of safeguarding the representativeness of thegovernment and its branches, on the other.

Basic Law proposal: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People – legal justification

By | Constitution, nation state | No Comments

Aviad Bakshi

The goal of this position paper is to support the proposed Basic Law, Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People, and to present the legal justifications for the enactment of this Basic Law.

 

While it is true that the principle of Israel as the Jewish people’s nation-state had been firmly anchored in Israeli law and legislation for dozens of years and that it reflects the traditional values of the Israeli state; over the past twenty years there has been a dramatic erosion in this status by Supreme Court rulings. A fundamental circumstance in Israel’s present legal reality, is the lack of a legal anchor for Israel’s crucial dimension as the nation-state of the Jewish people. This Basic Law proposal is in line with the accepted traditions of Israeli law and simultaneously fills a practical legal need caused by deviation from this tradition by the Supreme Court rulings described above.

 

Traditionally, the legal values of Israel rested on court decisions in a common law system. In the common law era, the Supreme Court defended the principle of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people as well as the principles of the civil rights of its citizens. This harmony of of values  characterized Israel since its declaration of independence. During the 1990’s, however, the Israeli legal world underwent a constitutional revolution: the constitutional values of Israel ceased relying upon common law and were formalized in two Basic Laws passed in1992, expansively implemented by the Court. In the wake of the Knesset’s opposition to this Court-enacted constitutional revolution, the crafting of values-based Basic Laws ceased, and since 1992, no new Basic Law has been passed. Without any legislative intent, Israel passed from a legal system based on common law focused on the two characteristics mentioned above to a formal legal system which enforced only one of these two national characteristics. Without any real intent or even deliberation, the historic balance between the principles of Israel as a nation-state and of Israel as a country respecting the individual human rights of its citizens was shattered; the principle of a Jewish state now occupies an inferior position in the hierarchy of Israeli legal norms.

 

To document this untoward predicament, this position paper sets forth legal research into the following concrete issues defining Israel’s identity as the nation state of the Jewish People: the granting of lands and incentives for the establishment of Jewish settlements, the primacy granted in Israel to the Hebrew language, political participation of parties which reject the existence of Israel as the Jewish state, and Israeli immigration policies towards those who are not eligible for the “right of return”.

 

The conclusions of this legal research is crystal clear: Over the past twenty years we have witnessed significant erosion of the weight granted by the Supreme Court to the Jewish character of Israel- a dramatic abandonment of the path pursued during the first 44 years of Israel’s existence.

The need to legislate a Basic Law which will anchor the principle of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people in law is thus clear. This Basic Law, together with the existing Basic Laws advancing individual human rights, will return the Israeli legal system to its common law roots consistent with the values expressed in the Israeli declaration of independence, will re-establish the healthy balance in fundamental values, and will reaffirm the principles and sentiments of the vast majority of the Israeli public for whom Israel is both the Jewish state and a democratic state.

 To the full position paper  (Hebrew)